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ABSTRACT 
We consider the relative robustness of libertarian anarchy and liberal democracy to meddlesome 
preferences. Specifically, we examine how the liberty of those wishing to engage in externally 
harmless activities is affected by people who wish to prevent them from doing so. We show that 
intense, concentrated meddlesome preferences are more likely to produce illiberal law in anarchy; 
while weak, dispersed meddlesome preferences are more likely to do so in democracy. Using insights 
from the economics of religion, we argue that anarchy is more likely than democracy to produce small 
groups with intense meddlesome preferences. Absent government provision of public goods, 
voluntary groups will emerge to fill the gap. Strict religious groups – ‘sects’ – are more able to 
overcome collective action problems and will therefore be more prevalent in an anarchic society. 
These sects are apt to instil intense meddlesome preferences in their members and have the ability to 
enforce them: anarchy produces the situation to which it is most fragile. Our argument reveals 
unresolved questions in the conventional understanding of institutional robustness. 
Keywords: Robust Political Economy, Anarcho-capitalism, Economics of Religion, Ideology, 
Endogenous Preferences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We should evaluate political systems not only on how they behave under ideal assumptions but also 
on how they behave when those assumptions fail. John Stuart Mill and, more recently, James M. 
Buchanan have both stressed the desirability of considering the worst-case scenario when comparing 
alternative institutions. Adam Smith’s thought, when considered as a whole, is an example of this 
robust thinking: in Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that people have significant concern for 
others while in The Wealth of Nations, he shows that a market order would produce beneficial 
outcomes even if people were selfish. 
The modern variant of ‘robust political economy’ derives primarily from the work of Buchanan,1 who 
suggests that making worst-case assumptions at the level constitutional choice, even if those 
assumptions are empirically unfounded, protects against particularly bad outcomes. Like insurance, 
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this protection normally comes at a cost. If a less robust system performs better under ideal 
conditions, the suboptimal performance of the robust system in such cases is analogous to an 
insurance premium. 
Robust political economy and worst-case theorizing has enjoyed something of a renaissance of late. 
David Levy (2002) attempts to add precision to the idea of Buchanan’s robust political economy by 
linking it with J.W. Tukey’s idea of robust statistics. Peter Boettke and various co-authors have 
published a number of articles using the idea of robustness (Boettke 2000; Boettke et al 2005; Boettke 
& Leeson 2004, 2006; Boettke & López 2002; Leeson et al 2006). Crampton and Farrant (2004) show 
traditional constitutional political economy to be non-robust to expressive preferences; they later 
(2006, 2008) argue the normative implications of the Austrian calculation argument are not robust to 
assumptions of self-interested planners. 
We here consider the relative robustness of libertarian anarchy and liberal democracy to meddlesome 
preferences. In particular, we show how the negative rights of those wishing to engage in externally 
harmless activities are affected by the introduction of people who wish to prevent them engaging in 
those activities. This will reveal limitations and unanswered questions in the way robust political 
economy has been understood by Levy, Boettke, and others.2   
2. ANARCHY AND PREFERENCES 
Stringham and Hummel (2008) argue that preferences are important for the performance of orderly 
anarchy. Prior analyses by both advocates (Friedman 1989; Caplan & Stringham 2003) and critics 
(Cowen 1992; Cowen & Sutter 1999, 2005) of anarcho-capitalism have heeded Stigler’s dictum, 
leaving preferences to one side and focusing on constraints. Where most work has focused on the 
mechanics of anarcho-capitalism, Stringham and Hummel argue that a prior shift in popular 
preferences towards libertarianism would be necessary for a stable and feasible libertarian anarchy. 
So, where Cowen and Sutter (2005) see the assumed positive coercion payoffs as leading to the 
breakdown of libertarian anarchy, Stringham and Hummel argue that a shift in preferences away from 
coercion may be feasible. Institutions change payoffs and preferences change the subjective ranking 
of payoffs. If there were an ideological constraint against coercion, people would choose not to 
coerce, even in the face of positive material payoffs. Stringham and Hummel (2008, pp. 7-14) argue 
that preferences can change over time and point to a number of historical examples. 
Stringham and Hummel are, of course, correct. In the limiting case of a world populated by 
individuals with identical preferences, social choice problems disappear. But, if preferences can 
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become more liberal, they can also become more illberal:.Stringham and Hummel base their argument 
for anarcho-capitalism on a best-case view of preferences and ideology in which people accept 
libertarian doctrine and refuse to engage in coercive behaviour. Under these assumptions, anarchy will 
outperform the minimal state. Considering the worst-case scenario of changing preferences, however, 
is not straightforward. 
Farrant (2004, pp. 449-450) points out that deviations from best-case assumptions are not as clear-cut 
and one-dimensional as those of statistics. Real people can deviate from assumptions of public-
spiritedness or rationality in many ways; consequently, we cannot rate one political system as more 
robust than another simpliciter. The precise deviations from assumptions need to be specified as it is 
possible that one system will be more robust to deviation in one direction, but less robust to deviation 
in another, than the alternative.  
For the purposes of this paper, we will place ourselves into the ‘sweet spot’ identified by Caplan and 
Stringham (2003) where the network of protection agencies is strong enough to punish rogue agents 
but not so strong as to be able to form a government-replicating cartel. In this case, libertarian anarchy 
will be robust to the existence of self-interested knaves: a well-functioning private defence industry 
will be capable of preventing aggression against property. The libertarianism of libertarian anarchy, 
however, will be less robust to certain distributions of meddlesome preferences. In an anarchic 
society, not only the protection of rights, but also the definition of the rights themselves is determined 
by market forces: if consumers demand illiberal law, that is what they will get.  
3. ILLIBERAL ANARCHY 
3.1 Markets in Meddlesome Preference Enforcement 
In a well-functioning market for law, for now holding constant relative technical efficiency of 
enforcement and avoidance, those rights which garner the highest total willingness to pay will be the 
rights enforced. When preferences are libertarian in the way Stringham and Hummel imagine and 
also, if Caplan and Stringham’s (2003) argument is correct, when preferences are knavish and self-
regarding, a free society emerges. But in any actual society, some people will have preferences over 
things libertarians see as none of their business. If the total willingness to pay to have some activity 
prohibited exceeds the total willingness to pay to avoid prohibition, the activity will be prohibited 
regardless of what libertarian political philosophy has to say about it. 
Buchanan (2001 [1977], pp. 24-26) points out the differences of opinion on the boundaries of personal 
rights. Even self-described libertarians disagree at the margin on what the individual has a right to 
do.3 Virtually everything we do affects other people in some way, so Mill’s (1859, Ch. 1, Para. 9) 
principle that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ does not get us very far. The harm 
principle is imprecise without an adequate definition of harm. We cannot even rely on traditional 
definitions of externality to solve the problem: Pareto-relevant technological externalities are of 
course defined relative to individual willingness-to-pay (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962) and here 
the default rights position is what’s at stake. Even if some natural limit of personal sovereignty exists, 
though it’s hard to see how this could be a meaningful proposition, libertarian anarchy would only be 
libertarian to the degree to which people accept the validity of this limit. Persistent disagreement 
makes this seem unlikely. 
The production of illiberal laws in anarchy would not necessarily be a market failure. The market is 
good at satisfying preferences, whether or not those preferences are libertarian. If the market is more 
efficient than government, it is better at producing both public goods and public bads: Cowen and 
Sutter (1999) show that cooperative efficacy has both social benefits and social costs; Crampton and 
Farrant (2006, 2008) similarly argue that planner ‘calculative efficacy’ is harmful when planners are 
self-interested. 
It is not difficult to imagine realistic distributions of preferences under which anarchy would produce 
illiberal laws. If a large majority of the population disliked the idea of people taking drugs and were 
willing to pay to have their preference satisfied, for example, it is likely that drugs would in effect be 
banned (Cowen 1992, p. 256). Of course, enforcement is a public good vis-à-vis the anti-drug 
majority; but if that free-rider problem cannot be solved, neither can many others. 
There needn’t be a majority of busybodies for an anarchist society to become illiberal: a minority of 
zealous anti-smokers could outweigh a smaller minority of smokers if the majority of non-smokers 
were indifferent to smoking or the rights of smokers. As long as the willingness to pay for the 
indulgence of meddlesome preferences exceeds the willingness to pay for protection of liberties, an 
efficient market will produce an illiberal society.  
Busybodies could choose to enforce their preferences themselves or, more realistically, hire protection 
agencies to do so by paying for a ‘premium service’, as Long (2003) puts it, which includes efforts to 
prevent undesired behaviour on the part of others. Long is correct that the number willing to pay for 
this premium service is bound to be less than the number willing to vote for a similar policy. This 
does not mean there will be less effort devoted to enforcing meddlesome preferences in anarchy as we 
here count dollar-votes rather than noses. In democracy, only broadly-shared preferences tend to 
                                                     
3 See, for example, Walter Block’s (2003) argument on the appropriate application of the non-aggression axiom 
in lifeboat situations. 
affect outcomes. While the number of people willing to enforce meddlesome preferences in anarchy is 
likely to be less than those willing to vote for such enforcement, those few can have greater effect in 
anarchy. 
How are busybody preferences enforced in anarchy when the objects of unwanted attention can pay 
for protection against same?  Cowen and Sutter (2005) make the case that a cartelized network of 
protection agencies easily could enforce restrictions against drug use, for example, if cartel agencies’ 
clients found drug use objectionable and the network consequently declared rogue those agencies 
protecting the rights of drug users. In that case, the cartel has become government. Absent a cartel, 
enforcement of busybody preferences is more difficult but remains likely. 
Consider the case where the dollar-weighted preferences of a busybody minority greatly outweigh the 
dollar-weighted preferences of the objects of their tender mercies, with all others indifferent. 
Busybodies purchase protection, at a premium, from agencies guaranteeing that sanctioned behaviour 
is punished and that clients of libertine agencies are forbidden from properties under their protection. 
These agencies form their own network with two-tiered membership: contributor agencies with 
busybody clients paying a premium, and compliant agencies with indifferent clients willing to be 
subject to busybody regulation in exchange for subsidized arbitration fees. Busybodies subsidize the 
indifferent if they agree to exclude libertines. So long as those indifferent see cost savings from 
busybody subsidies greater than losses from lost transactions with libertines, they’ll choose busybody-
compliant agencies. 
So, if busybody preferences are of sufficient intensity, agencies will have a client-based demand to 
effectively declare rogue the libertine agencies. Busybody-compliant firms insufficiently vigilant in 
policing behaviour among their clients lose access to the subsidised arbitration network. Becker’s 
(1971) analysis of discrimination is apposite: where customers are racist, a segregation equilibrium 
obtains even where firm owners are not racist. Here, libertines suffer discrimination under similar 
conditions. A first response by libertines will be to cluster with similar types; however, having lost 
most opportunities for dealings with the indifferent majority, their neighbourhoods would necessarily 
become increasingly autarkic. Those with the weakest libertine preferences defect to busybody-
compliant agencies, further reducing transactions opportunities for libertines, increasing average costs 
of membership in libertine agencies, and encouraging further defection. While nothing in the process 
infringes on anyone’s rights, it is difficult to view the outcome as libertarian. 
3.2 Meddlesome Preferences under Democracy 
Meddlesome preferences are not a problem unique to settings of market-chosen law; most countries 
have in place legislation prohibiting drug use and prostitution, for example. Such policies are 
generally popular despite many analyses suggesting that they cause more harm than they prevent. We 
here discuss how meddlesome preferences become policy under democracy before turning to 
comparative institutional analysis. 
We begin with an ideal-type4 democracy: politicians are faithful agents of voters, are not constrained 
by constitutional limitations, and do not engage in vote trading across issues. At all times, that which 
commands majority assent then becomes policy. Without vote trading or bargaining, an ideal 
democracy will produce those laws preferred by a majority or plurality of voters. Under those 
conditions, meddlesome preferences become policy only if a majority share those preferences: if the 
median voter is a busybody, policy follows. In cases where a minority of busybodies has greater 
intensity-weighted numbers than do the libertines that would be subject to regulation, regulation is not 
enacted regardless of preference intensity on either side so long as the median voter is indifferent to 
the libertines’ activities. An ideal market perfectly represents preference intensity; an ideal democracy 
completely ignores it. 
 3.2.1 Democracy when preference intensity matters 
Real democracies, of course, vary from their ideal representation. First, many aspects of democracy 
seem designed to allow preference intensity to be given weight, making outcomes closer to those of 
markets than would otherwise be the case. Wittman (1989, 1995) argues that political markets are 
designed to allow efficient Coasean bargains between legislators as agents of voters. Legislators 
operate in competitive electoral markets and are brought together in a small numbers situation in 
which negotiation is cheap. When legislators’ constituencies place different values on different 
policies, there are potential gains from trade that can be realized via logrolling. Wittman goes so far as 
to argue that political markets are as efficient as economic markets, giving appropriate weight to 
preference intensity and achieving Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. In that case, busybodies achieve their 
desired outcome by subsidizing the indifferent majority via support for other pieces of legislation 
where those indifferent on the meddlesome-preference dimension have stronger preferences. 
The argument presented here depends not simply on the idea that political markets are inefficient, but 
rather that, as compared to economic markets, political markets place proportionately less weight on 
strong than weak preferences. The degree to which logrolling places weight on preference intensity 
depends on what, precisely, legislators trade. Even if Wittman is correct that political markets 
minimize transaction costs and leave no gains from trade unrealized, trade in such markets is limited 
to political resources.  
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Vote-trading allows for mutually beneficial trades within the political sphere, but not mutually 
beneficial trades between the political and non-political spheres. Strong norms and legal penalties 
against side-payments of non-political resources create high transaction costs between these spheres 
and thereby limit the extent to which preference intensity is reflected in policy. Logrolling allows a 
person with a relatively strong preference over one issue and relatively weak preference over another 
to have a large influence on the former in exchange for a small influence on the latter. If that person 
has strong preferences over all policies, however, they cannot easily trade non-political resources for 
extra influence over policy in general. Logrolling, then, gives weight to the intensity of political 
preferences relative to other political preferences, but not non-political preferences.  
This boundary between the political and non-political spheres is not absolute, however. There are two 
main channels through which a person can shift resources from the non-political to the political 
budget in a democracy: campaign contributions and lobbying. Taken together, these do seem to have a 
significant effect on policy outcomes (Potters & Sloof 1996). While it is impossible to directly 
measure whether this effect is strong enough to place anything close to perfect weight on preference 
intensity, there are strong theoretical reasons for doubt. 
Campaign contributions can influence policy outcomes in two ways.5 When political parties have 
fixed policy positions, contributors support their preferred party in order to increase its chances of 
election. When parties have flexible policy positions, contributors buy policy concessions. Since these 
concessions will move the party’s platform away from that preferred by the median voter, the 
contribution must be used to offset this electoral disadvantage through campaigning. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes (Stratmann 2005, pp. 
136-141), and campaign contributions on legislative votes (Ansolabehere et al 2003) are modest but 
real. 6 
Campaign contributions increase the political influence of those with strong preferences somewhat, 
but at a high cost. Political competition prevents politicians from ignoring the numerically-dominant 
preferences of voters in order to accept bribes. This is reflected in the fact that the level of 
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contribution is insignificant compared to the potential gains that would be available to interest groups 
if money could easily buy policy (Tullock 1972). Campaign contributions are better seen as 
expressive consumption goods than instrumental attempts at influencing policy (Ansolabehere et al 
2003). Lobbying may have greater effect on outcomes than campaign contributions; however, at least 
in the Hall and Deardorff (2006) model, lobbying works by changing relative priorities among 
policies viewed positively by legislators rather than by inducing legislators to support legislation 
opposed by their constituents. Legislators with functional support from interest-groups will be more 
effective than those without, but laws are ultimately passed on majoritarian grounds. 
Olson (1971) argues that groups more able to overcome free-rider problems and lobby the 
government are more likely to influence policy. Free-riding is easier to overcome in small groups of 
people with intense preferences. This provides another avenue for intense preferences, particularly 
those of groups with high cooperative efficacy, to affect policy. Inefficient policies such as trade 
protectionism and heavy-handed regulation are often blamed on vested interests having 
disproportionate influence on government through lobbying and campaign contributions. The 
empirics of public opinion and public policy, however, suggest such policies also are consistent with 
voter preferences: very few unpopular policies persist (Caplan & Stringham 2005), and policy is 
responsive to changes in voter preferences (Althaus 2003, Crampton 2002). While many policies do 
provide rents to concentrated interest groups, they also tend to enjoy majority support. Public choice 
considerations do distort policy outcomes, but typically on margins where voters are at worst 
indifferent. Busybodies seeking the implementation of policy running contrary to median voter 
preferences will have a difficult time.7 
3.3 Comparative Institutional Analysis: Meddlesome markets and politics 
While there is some scope for preference intensity to affect policy in democracy, the transaction costs 
of trading political for non-political goods are high; relatively few such trades occur. Legislators get 
some benefit from bending to the will of interest groups but cannot ignore the will of the majority and 
expect to stay in office. 
Anarchy, on the other hand, produces no budgetary boundary between political and non-political 
resources: law and private consumption are purchased with a common currency. A person with strong 
preferences over law can have a disproportionate influence in all issues by forgoing private 
consumption. The scope for preference intensity to influence law is thereby greater under anarchy 
than democracy.  
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Arguing that meddlesome preferences can be easier to enforce through the market than democracy 
appears to contradict Roback’s (1986) insight that discrimination is cheaper at the ballot box than in 
the marketplace. She shows that legislation rather than consumer demand drove streetcar segregation 
in the American South under Jim Crowe; streetcar companies did not find it profitable to enforce such 
a policy voluntarily as there was insufficient effective consumer demand - taste for discrimination - 
for segregation to emerge in the market. In the voting booth, people were unencumbered by the cost 
of their preferences and those with even the slightest inclination voted for segregation.8 As Caplan 
(2001, 2007) argues, preferences are cheaper to express in the voting booth than the marketplace. This 
produces race-based discrimination under democracy but not the market when the majority is mildly 
racist and the minority is strongly non-racist, as Roback shows. If we invert the distribution of 
preferences, we should expect the opposite result. 
In the market for law, the willingness to pay relative to others determines which rules prevail; in 
democracy, the largely unweighted preferences of voters. When most people are mildly racist, a 
democracy will produce racist law while a market will not. When most people are mildly anti-racist, a 
democracy will produce non-racist law. In some such situations, a market will produce racist law. If a 
majority of voters prefer law A, but B garners more willingness to pay, a democracy will produce A 
and a market will produce B. This is equally true whether A or B is an illiberal law.  
We should expect the market to produce illiberal laws when meddlesome preferences are held 
strongly by a few individuals. Individuals with idealistically libertarian  preferences willing to stand 
up for the rights of the oppressed minority may counterweight the preferences of busybodies, but 
worst-case theorizing counsels against relying on this. Majority rule will produce illiberal laws when 
meddlesome preferences are held weakly by many individuals. Those harmed by illiberal laws, as 
well as idealistic liberals, will attempt to lobby government for their repeal. Again, the success of such 
attempts should not be relied upon. If a majority favour a particular law, it will likely prevail. 
Suppose an illiberal minority’s utility from enforcing an illiberal law exceeds that of an oppressed 
minority plus a weakly liberal majority from a liberal law. In this situation the unweighted preferences 
will obviously be in favour of the liberal law. If democracy gives some weight to preference intensity 
the majority favouring the liberal law will need to be significant. More formally: where WTPx(y) is 
the willingness to pay of group x for law y above and beyond implementation and enforcement costs 
and Nx is group x’s numerical strength.  
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WTPilliberal(ban) > WTPoppressed minority(allow) + WTPweakly liberal(allow) 
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In this situation the market produces illiberal law while democracy produces liberal law. This is not a 
market failure, but libertarians should prefer the democratic outcome. The liberalism of anarchy is 
more fragile to intense meddlesome preferences, while the liberalism of democracy is more fragile to 
weak meddlesome preferences. 
Of course, it is likely that there are cost differences between enforcing illiberal laws and protecting 
oneself against those laws. Preventing a person from taking drugs requires constant monitoring and 
enforcement. To avoid all but the most serious attempts at drug prohibition, a person simply needs to 
refrain from public use. Even if the illiberal minority had a greater willingness to pay for prohibition 
than drug users had for toleration, cost differentials could maintain the liberal outcome.  
This narrows the range of preferences under which anarchy will produce illiberal law, but does not 
remove the potential altogether. Illiberal law will prevail when the preference differential between 
liberal and illiberal law outweighs the cost differential. Further, the cost asymmetry between 
enforcement and avoidance is not universal as some laws require very little monitoring. A religious 
group wishing to prevent public statements criticizing its doctrines would not be faced with 
significant monitoring costs since the very act of making a public statement makes the act apparent to 
any interested party.9 
Even if illiberal laws cannot be perfectly enforced, imperfect enforcement can impose significant 
costs on the oppressed minority and have a substantial effect on behaviour. A group wishing to 
prevent drug use may find it prohibitively costly to monitor people in their homes, but more 
manageable to prevent open sale. Making potential customers aware of an offer for sale also informs 
others. Imperfect enforcement would lead to black markets. If drugs cannot be openly used, sold, and 
advertised, liberty is thereby reduced. The effect is little different from that of government 
prohibition. As things stand, the police find it costly to prevent drug use and do not enforce 
prohibition perfectly.  
Moving away from a static comparison, cost innovation in the private sector could make anarchic law 
more enforceable over time. Market incentives for innovation would enable protection agencies to 
more efficiently monitor and enforce prohibitions. It is impossible to say whether these incentives 
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would increase efficiency enough to match the power of coercive taxation and make illiberal law 
more enforceable under anarchy than government, but the efficiency advantage of those wishing to 
protect against such laws will be lost. 
4. ENDOGNOUS BIGOTRY    
Since institutions have cultural effects (Bowles 1998), the robustness of a political system depends not 
simply on its behaviour under varying conditions, but also on the likelihood of those conditions 
holding. Farrant (2004, p. 448) sees this as a problem in Levy’s analogy between robust political 
economy and robust statistics. The technique used in statistical analysis does not affect the normality 
of the data whereas the prevailing political and economic institutions do affect the preferences of 
individuals.  
The link between institutions and preference outcomes is difficult. Cowen (2007) suggests that 
government is a normal good: people demand more of it as they become wealthier. If anarchism 
produces more wealth, Cowen’s hypothesis suggests that it would also produce more government. 
Stringham and Hummel (2008, p. 7) speculate that as people get wealthier and more educated, they 
will become more cultured, accept the humane teachings of libertarianism, and stop believing bad 
economic arguments for government intervention. If libertarian anarchy makes people richer than 
democracy, it might be more likely to keep people libertarian. 
There is no reason to think that preferences or ideology will be homogenous in an anarchic society; to 
speak of preferences changing in a liberal or illiberal direction is a simplification. The argument 
above suggests that a relatively small group with illiberal preferences will be able to have those 
preferences satisfied if their preferences are sufficiently strong and collective action problems can be 
overcome. The economics of religion suggests that illiberal preferences and the cooperative efficacy 
of a group will be positively correlated. Anarchists and other libertarians imagine voluntary 
organizations stepping in to provide public goods currently provided by the state. If this is true – i.e. if 
state and voluntary organizations are substitutes – and a significant proportion of voluntary 
organizations are religious in nature, we should see more meddlesome preferences under anarchy than 
government.  
Churches and other religious organizations can be seen as clubs providing members a variety of quasi-
public goods (Buchanan 1965; Iannaccone 1998, pp. 1482-1484). Standard microeconomic theory 
predicts that as the state provides fewer public goods, the demand for services offered by churches 
increases. 
Hungerman (2005) finds evidence that church and state are substitutes by showing that a reduction in 
government welfare availability leads to an increase in charitable church activity. Welfare is a public 
good to the extent that people prefer others not live in poverty but would free-ride on the charity of 
others, and a club good to the degree it serves as social insurance. Government provision of at least 
one public good, then, crowds out private provision through churches. It seems very likely that this 
will be true of other public and club goods. In the absence of government, more public goods will be 
provided by religious organizations. 
Not all religious groups are meddlesome. However, Iannaccone (1988, 1992, 1994) argues that strict 
churches are more adept at producing club goods. Requiring members to conform to costly 
behavioural norms weeds out the uncommitted and reduces free-riding. There are positive 
externalities to other members from participation in church activities and monitoring costs increase 
with group size. Engaging in costly and apparently wasteful signalling can increase the value of group 
membership by increasing average participation. Members can also commit to the group by making 
themselves stigmatized by outsiders, thereby reducing their opportunities outside the group. This 
suggests a distinction between low-commitment ‘churches’ and high-commitment ‘sects’. While 
people can belong to churches at lower cost, sects provide more benefits. For Iannaccone, sects are 
not the product of brainwashing, as is commonly supposed, but second-best solutions to collective 
action problems.  
Sects are better than churches at producing both religious and material club goods such as protection 
and various other social services. In the absence of government, we should expect to see more sects 
(Iannaccone & Berman 2006). Mulholland (2007) finds that hate groups are more likely to form in 
areas with less public schooling and more crime.10 Hate groups provide services such as protection 
and education while strict norms ensure active participation. 
While religious belief, by positing an unquestionable and objective moral order, seems a particularly 
effective means of binding cult-like clubs together, non-religious sects are also possible. The cases of 
Islamic terrorism and the various white-supremacist groups in the United States and elsewhere offer 
striking examples of sects enforcing illiberal standards of conduct and otherwise coercing outsiders.  
Berman and Laitin (2008) argue that extremist religious groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the 
Taliban are particularly adept at producing local public goods. Such groups tend to arise in areas with 
little government provision of public goods. These groups place strong prohibitions on members and 
also attempt to enforce their value-systems on outsiders. The requirement for signalling in sects means 
that these groups are able to recruit and retain members willing to engage in very costly activities, 
including making suicide attacks. 
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While sects do not necessarily attempt to enforce illiberal rules on outsiders, the usual argument 
against this happening in anarchy is absent. The costliness of monitoring and punishing behaviour 
deemed undesirable by the cult does not provide a disincentive, since costliness is a necessary part of 
signalling. Since cults are more cooperatively effective than churches or the general population, they 
will have fewer problems enforcing whatever preferences they have. 
To illustrate, suppose a sect has greater willingness to pay for and derives greater utility from an 
illiberal law than does the oppressed minority for and from a liberal law. Let us further suppose that 
the addition of a weakly liberal majority makes the total utility from the liberal law greater than for 
the illiberal law. Anarchy would produce the liberal law if the costs of cooperation were constant 
across groups. If the sect has sufficiently greater cooperative efficacy than the liberal majority, 
however, anarchy will produce illiberal law. The cooperative efficacy of the oppressed minority will 
normally be irrelevant, since self-protection is a private good.  
Using the same notation as above, but with the addition of Cx denoting the cooperative efficacy of 
group x, and Ux(y) denoting the aggregate utility group x derives from law y, democracy will produce 
liberal law and anarchy illiberal law when: 
WTPx(y)= f(Ux(y), Nx, Cx (Nx)) 
WTPsect(ban) > WTPoppressed minority(allow) + WTPweakly liberal(allow) 
Nsect< Noppressed minority+Nweakly liberal 
This result violates utilitarian criteria when 
Usect(ban) > Uminority(allow) 
Usect(ban) < Umajority(allow) + Uminority(allow) 
In anarchy, free-riding means the liberal majority cannot cooperate and provides little or no protection 
of the minority against the sect. Sect-members have their way. In the case above, we have something 
of a market failure. Democracy decreases the costs of cooperation for the weakly liberal majority 
compared to the sect. Since law is positional in either markets or democracies, this produces more 
liberal law.11 
                                                     
11 This may understate the benefit of democracy relative to anarchy. With higher cooperative efficacy, the 
resources expended on enforcement may also have a greater effect on outcomes. 
Borrowing the basic structure from Levy (2002), but adding a third dimension, figures 1-3 represent 
the comparison graphically.12 The horizontal axes represent the proportion of the population with 
meddlesome preferences and the intensity of those preferences respectively. The vertical axis 
represents the resulting level of liberty. The shaded plane shows the level of liberty resulting from any 
combination of proportion and intensity of meddlesome preferences. 
The graphs show that neither anarchy nor democracy is more robust to meddlesome preferences in 
general. Anarchy produces more liberty than government under ideal conditions, i.e. when nobody has 
meddlesome preferences. The liberalism of anarchy is more robust to dispersed (high proportion, low 
intensity) meddlesome preferences, while that of democracy is more robust to concentrated (low 
proportion, high intensity) meddlesome preferences. 
In figure 1, representing anarchy, liberty decreases with increases in the proportion of the population 
with meddlesome preferences but, due to the higher cooperative efficacy of small groups, at a 
decreasing rate. Liberty decreases with meddlesome preference intensity at an increasing rate due to 
the higher cooperative efficacy of groups with strong preferences.  
 
Fig. 1: Liberty and Meddlesome Preferences in Anarchy 
                                                     
12 Crampton and Farrant (2006: 90) make similar use of a three-dimensional graph representing the robustness 
of a political institution to two interacting variables. The graphs are meant to be illustrative rather than precise. 
As such, only the general contours are relevant to our argument 
In figure 2, representing democracy, liberty remains relatively constant with proportion until slightly 
less than 50%, before dropping suddenly as the majority becomes meddlesome. Liberty does not fall 
straight down at 50%, as it would under ideal-type democracy, since logrolling and the logic of 
collective action give some weight to preference intensity. This is shown by the mild but increasing 
slope on the intensity axis. As preferences become very intense, the cooperative efficacy of illiberal 
groups will increase and they will be more able to lobby government.  
Fig. 2: Liberty and Meddlesome Preferences in Democracy 
Figure 3 overlays anarchy and democracy, with the shaded regions showing the plane which produces 
a higher level of liberty for the corresponding distribution of meddlesome preferences. Democracy, 
represented by lighter shading, tends to dominate where proportion is low. Anarchy dominates in 
close to ideal conditions, and also where proportion is high. The vertical distance between the planes 
is especially pronounced with high proportion and low intensity, where anarchy dominates, and with 
low proportion and high intensity, where democracy dominates. 
As sects grow, they often come to resemble governments in their own right - the Taliban being an 
obvious example. There is thus a fine line between Cowen and Sutter’s cartelization argument against 
libertarian anarchy and our own. Sects may be another avenue through which anarchy evolves into 
government – in this case extremely repressive government. 
Fig. 3: Anarchy and Democracy Compared 
The theory presented here implies that there are cases in which coercive discrimination or 
enforcement of illiberal norms is possible through non-governmental action, but prevented by 
government. The search for clear historical examples of democratic politics preventing coercion by 
sects is complicated by a number of factors. There are no natural experiments in which functional 
democracies transform into anarchy or vice-versa. In democracies, any coercive behaviour of sects is 
normally prevented by existing laws, so it is generally impossible to see private coercion dealt-with 
through the democratic process.13 Further, since sects have high cooperative efficacy, they are well-
positioned to influence government as well as take private action. 
The activities of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States show that people are willing to go to 
significant lengths to enforce their preferences, especially when acting as part of a group. While the 
Klan did make use of local government, individual members also made significant contributions in 
terms of vigilantism. The group was very cooperatively effective. It was able to coerce people 
privately through violence and intimidation, and also influence government-made law. The Klan 
                                                     
13 Here, in Bastiat’s terms, ignoring the unseen in favour of the seen leads us to underestimate the value of 
democracy compared to markets.  
would likely have continued to exist without government support and, if the sect-state substitution 
thesis is correct, the group would have been stronger in an anarchic society.14 
Of more serious recent concern have been radical Islamic sects in Europe, members of which have 
enforced within-group norms by means of so-called honour killings15 (Kurkiala 2003, Bedell 2004, 
Biehl 2005) and punished external criticism by threat and murder (Smith 2004, Kay 2005). 
Democratic governments have there sought to preserve liberal norms against private illiberal 
enforcement efforts. The fact that members of sects have been willing to take significant costly action 
even with government opposition, combined with the substitutability of government and sect, is 
evidence suggesting that we would see more private effort at illiberal norm enforcement in anarchy. 
A system of libertarian anarchy seems to help to promote the world-states under which it is least 
robust to the influence of those with meddlesome preferences.  In that state of the world, democracy 
should be preferred if the relevant dimension for evaluation is freedom from meddlesome impositions.  
Democracy, by comparison, is least robust to states of the world in which a large proportion of the 
population holds low-intensity meddlesome preferences.  And, worryingly, democracy may well 
foster low-intensity meddlesome preferences via fiscal externalities: costs of an individual’s 
behaviour that fall on taxpayers because of the operation of a welfare state, public health system, or 
other social insurance mechanism.  While Browning (1999) rather convincingly argues that such 
externalities are pecuniary rather than technological, as they operate via the budget constraint rather 
than affecting the utility function directly, such distinctions seem to have little effect on public 
demand for regulation of activities that have such effects. 
We have focused on meddlesome preferences under anarchy, where they previously were assumed to 
have very little effect; it’s rather more obvious that meddlesome preferences are embodied in many 
kinds of legislation under democracy.  We conjecture, though, that democracy may well work to build 
the kinds of preferences against which it is least robust.  Where democracy seems invariably to lead to 
social insurance, and where social insurance seems invariably to lead to moral hazard problems, it’s 
difficult to avoid the further step to regulations prohibiting demerit goods16 that cause fiscal 
                                                     
14 The Klan’s activities were reduced by the Civil Rights Act of 1871. At first glance, this seems to be a 
historical example of the argument presented here, with democracy producing liberal law where private action 
was illiberal. The act, however, was largely the result of Northern legislators and voters enforcing constraints on 
those in the South. Southern state governments were largely unwilling to pass legislation against the Klan.  
15 A BBC survey (BBC, 2006) found that 10% of young British Asians believe honour-killings can be 
justifiable. 
16 Demerit goods are, of course, just fancy talk for things of which folks disapprove.  The set of activities 
causing negative fiscal externalities is very large and includes such elements as drug abuse, smoking (if you 
discount taxes collected), skydiving, sex, failure to exercise, having low-quality children, not eating enough 
vegetables, running a car with a badly-tuned engine, not taking your vitamins, playing football, drinking too 
externalities.  Regulation and taxation of activities causing negative fiscal externalities seems 
restricted to demerit goods within that set: nobody would think of taxing the man who runs into a 
burning building to save the terminally ill costly Medicare patient.  It seems that fiscal externalities 
then give voters a reason to demand bans on activities they find distasteful but that they might tolerate 
if costs were internalized.  Both systems seem to give rise to the conditions to which they are least 
robust, though the dynamics under democracy require further examination. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that the effect of meddlesome preferences on anarchy and democracy is not 
straightforward. Anarchy more robustly protects the negative rights of individuals in the presence of 
widely-held, weak meddlesome preferences; democracy in the presence of concentrated, intense 
meddlesome preferences. The substitutability of state and sect makes anarchy more likely than 
democracy to produce small groups with meddlesome preferences and high cooperative efficacy: 
exactly the situation to which it is least robust.  
In cases like these, gustibus est disputandem: taking preferences as exogenous provides a weaker 
understanding of social change. While political institutions undoubtedly have a large effect on liberty 
and human welfare, so does ideology. Liberal institutions will not emerge unless people desire them, 
and preferences influence the operation of the prevailing system (North 1988; Stringham & Hummel 
2008; Hummel 1990, 2001).  
Before a comparison between anarchism and the minimal state is politically relevant, preferences 
would need to shift dramatically in a libertarian direction. Even if anarchism is not desirable with the 
current distribution of preferences, it may become desirable just as it becomes politically feasible: the 
desirability and feasibility of anarchy are not independent (Hummel 2001, pp. 533-534). The very 
preferences that would make libertarian anarchy feasible, however, also lessen its departure from 
democracy, since law tracks preferences in virtually any political system.17 
To assume libertarian preferences are stable is best-case thinking, and any political system which 
requires a specific set of preferences is fragile. Since the conditions under which anarchy is desirable, 
from a liberal perspective, are not likely to be stable and in any case produce libertarian law under 
democracy, the libertarian has another reason to be reticent about experimenting with anarchy (Cowen 
& Sutter 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
much alcohol and not drinking enough alcohol (as moderate consumption seems best for health).  The demerit 
goods are the ones that are taxed, regulated, or forbidden.   
17 Lee (1999) makes a similar argument regarding the minimal state.  
Our argument reveals a number of problems with recent work in robust political economy. Levy’s 
(2002) amalgamation of various desirable consequences into the generic variable ‘good stuff’ leads to 
a neglect of important distinctions: we value many things, and these may be affected differently by the 
same institution. The judgement of whether one institution is more robust than another presupposes an 
appraisal of the relative importance of various values. We have shown that under anarchy it is 
possible for liberty to decrease while welfare in the Kaldor-Hicks sense increases. Libertarians will 
argue that this is a bad thing, but must do so on philosophical, rather than purely economic, grounds. 
The interaction of multiple variables further complicates robust political economy. The effect of 
meddlesome preferences on the performance of a political system depends on both their prevalence 
and intensity. Neither anarchy nor democracy is more robust than the other to meddlesome 
preferences simpliciter, much less more robust in general. As Crampton and Farrant (2006, 2008) 
show, seemingly unrelated variables can interact to affect the performance of an institution. 
Individually, planner ignorance and self-interest both affect citizen welfare negatively under 
socialism. Given self-interested planners, however, deviations from planner omniscience are welfare-
increasing.  
Further, the deviations from ideal assumptions are not independent of the institution in question. The 
dynamics of anarchy make sects more likely to form than under democracy, while fiscal externalities 
may promote busybody regulation in democracy. Simple worst-case theorizing implies the use of a 
minimax decision rule (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1964) and does not allow subtle comparison of 
institutional robustness. It is not only the performance of the system under worst-case assumptions, or 
even under a range of varyingly bad assumptions, that should be taken as the criterion of robustness, 
but also the probability of those assumptions holding (Taylor 2008).  
Recent works of robust political economy have focused on the knowledge and incentive problems of 
socialist planners, neglecting the numerous other factors affecting the performance of political 
economic systems. By focusing on welfare or prosperity, these analyses have not grappled with the 
problem of exactly what degrades when ideal-assumptions are relaxed.  
Most recent work has neglected careful specification of the dependent variable, since a focus on 
aggregate welfare or economic performance is reasonably straightforward18; treated independent 
variables in isolation; moved unproblematically from consideration of one dependent and one or two 
independent variables to a conclusion that one institution is more robust than another; and ignored the 
effect of institutions on independent variables.  
                                                     
18 Wagner (2006) is an exception.  
Robust political economy is a more versatile analytical tool than has so far been demonstrated. While 
it has proved useful in considering the relative merits of socialism and liberalism, as well as 
unconstrained majority-rule and constitutional democracy, it has much more to offer. To realize this 
potential, a more careful specification of institutional robustness is required.  
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